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OF MUSHROOMS AND NULLIFIERS: RULES OF EVIDENCE AND 
THE AMERICAN JURY 
STEPHAN LANDSMAN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
America presently has a strikingly elaborate evidentiary system.  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence, the single most influential evidentiary code in the 
United States, is organized into eleven articles containing sixty separate rules.  
Most of these rules have a variety of subparts, for example the two core 
hearsay requirements (Federal Rules 803 and 804) have, between them, 
twenty-eight hearsay exceptions.  Each rule and subpart is subject to ongoing 
judicial interpretation and is likely to have hundreds, if not thousands, of 
potentially authoritative judicial explications.  It has often been remarked that 
this enormous volume of evidentiary prescriptions is one of the key differences 
between the American and Continental evidentiary approaches.  While 
scholars have appropriately cautioned that this contrast may be overstated,1 it 
should not be doubted that formal evidentiary requirements are a central facet 
of American trial regulation.  The evidence rules are particularly important 
because they have generally adopted a “prophylactic orientation”2 that may 
prevent a very substantial amount of information from being heard at trial. 
Since the late nineteenth century, it has been a theme among common law 
evidence scholars that the elaborate exclusionary evidence scheme is the 
product of Anglo-American commitment to trial by jury.3  This was perhaps 
most famously stated by James B. Thayer, who in 1898, in his enormously 
influential A Treatise on Evidence at Common Law, declared that evidence law 
was “the child of the jury system.”4  This claim is open to doubt in light of 
findings that British jury trials during the seventeenth and much of the 
 
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University, College of 
Law, U.S.A. 
 1. MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 8-10 (1997). 
 2. Id. at 12. 
 3. Not all evidence scholars agree that the jury was the progenitor of the rules of evidence.  
See, e.g., Edmund Morgan, The Jury and the Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, 4 U. CHI. L. REV. 
247 (1937) (focusing on adversary process rather than jury trial). 
 4. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON 
LAW 266 (1898). 
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eighteenth centuries utilized few evidentiary restrictions.5  Be that as it may, 
the bulk of America’s elaborate evidentiary code is today maintained and 
defended as a means of “protecting” lay jurors from evidence that, in one way 
or another, is claimed to pose a threat to appropriate jury decision-making.6 
Mirjan DamaÓka has recently argued that American evidence law has come 
“adrift.”7  By this he means that the institutions which produced it, including 
jury trial, climactic continuous trial confrontations undertaken without 
elaborate discovery or other pretrial preparation (hence likely to yield 
significant evidentiary surprises at trial) and two-party, zero-sum adversary 
proceedings are all in decline.  The ultimate effect of this decline is to 
undermine the foundations upon which the elaborate exclusionary evidence 
structure rests.  According to DamaÓka, what will replace the present rules 
structure is hard to determine, but is likely to be more accommodating to the 
increased flow of evidence generated by technical and scientific processes.8  
Although it is not the major thrust of his book, DamaÓka has set forth a general 
sketch of what he thinks the future may hold for the rules of evidence.  As he 
puts it: 
Evidentiary rules will gradually cease to be designed with an eye to lawyer-
dominated jury trials and then applied, mutatis mutandis, across the board.  Of 
dubious propriety even under current conditions, this approach will become 
plainly obsolete with the growing differentiation of the legal process.  
Alternative shaping centers of evidence law are bound to emerge and over-
shadow jury trials as the matrix of the fact-finding style.  As arrangements 
tailored to jury trials are dethroned from their exalted position, common law 
evidence as we now know it is likely to be confined to a narrower sphere, 
perhaps serious criminal cases, or even completely discarded.  The most 
obvious candidate for rejection is the current law’s striking emphasis on the 
screening of information to be submitted to triers of fact.  This rejection alone 
will entail far-reaching consequences.  With the abandonment of the 
prophylactic orientation, for example, witnesses will obtain greater freedom to 
relate what they know.  This will greatly reduce the need to accord counsel the 
presently available powers to exercise tight editorial control over their 
testimony.  Even the most visible and widely known characteristic of the 
Anglo-American fact-finding method faces an uncertain future.9 
 
 5. See Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in 
Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497 (1990); John H. Langbein, Historical 
Foundations of the Law of Evidence: A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168 
(1996). 
 6. DAMAŠKA supra note 1, at 28-30. 
 7. Id. passim. 
 8. Id. at 143. 
 9. Id. at 149 (citations omitted). 
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DamaÓka’s hypothesis that there will be a shift away from jury trials as the 
“matrix” of evidence rule-making may, over the long haul, prove accurate but, 
for the moment, evidentiary change within the context of jury trials remains a 
lively and contested battleground in American law.  Indeed, a desire to regulate 
what juries consider has been responsible for the development of some of the 
most significant recent changes in that law.  Much of the new law has followed 
the pre-existing trend to circumscribe evidentiary presentations and has relied 
upon several well worn prophylactic tools including judicial pre-screening of 
proffered testimony and blindfolds to keep from the jury salient pieces of 
information about the parties or the consequences of the litigation.  After 
exploring recent examples of the ongoing effort to keep certain sorts of 
materials from the jury, a nascent counter-trend will be examined – one that is 
exerting pressure for the loosening of evidentiary strictures in jury trials. 
II.  HEIGHTENED PROPHYLAXIS 
Although DamaÓka does not note heightened prophylaxis as a step in the 
process leading to the decline of the jury as common law decision maker, it fits 
comfortably within his analytical scheme.  By ever more tightly regulating 
what the jury sees and hears, jury trials can be effectively marginalized.  
Eventually, if such a process is continued, the jury will see and hear so little 
and trials before it will be so rule-encumbered that jury proceedings will 
become prohibitively unattractive.  While rules drafters and courts have not 
articulated such an agenda, they have, in recent years, pursued a course that 
points in that direction.  Although the trend toward tighter regulation is not 
new, it has taken on added momentum in the last decade.  This may be seen in 
the way America’s federal courts have come to treat expert testimony, as well 
as the way both legislatures and courts have employed blindfolds to hide from 
jurors salient information about the consequences (in terms of civil or criminal 
liability) that may arise because of jury decisions. 
A. Expert Evidence 
In 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.10 That case involved the question whether Bendectin, a 
drug prescribed to treat morning sickness during pregnancy, caused birth 
defects among children whose mothers had used it.  Despite the fact that the 
defendant who manufactured the drug had done woefully inadequate testing, it 
came to appear over the course of protracted mass tort litigation and intensive 
epidemiological study that Bendectin did not have a demonstrable teratogenic 
effect.  In light of this scientific development, the question arose whether 
 
 10. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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plaintiffs in cases like Daubert could prove a cause of action.  In an effort to do 
so, plaintiffs offered experts who through reinterpretation of a long series of 
epidemiological studies and reliance on other data including animal testing and 
chemical structure comparison analysis, sought to demonstrate that it was still 
arguable that Bendectin caused birth defects.  In the Daubert case, the Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that this sort of expert evidence was not 
generally accepted and, therefore, should not be relied upon.  The Circuit Court 
barred the plaintiff from proceeding to trial. 
The Supreme Court accepted Daubert for review and declared that federal 
judges had a responsibility to serve as “gatekeepers” regarding scientific 
evidence.11  What this meant was that trial judges were expected to pre-screen 
scientific expert testimony.  Only if the evidence were found “both relevant 
and reliable” was it to be presented to a jury (something of a shift from the 
general acceptance standard used by the Ninth Circuit).12  Daubert has led 
federal judges to “flex their gatekeeper muscles to exclude vast quantities of 
plaintiffs’ proposed expert causation opinion evidence in products liability 
cases,”13 as well as limited expert evidence in other settings.14  The usual 
consequence of such rejection is that the case does not get to the jury but is 
dismissed on a motion for summary judgment before trial. 
In a 1997 opinion in a case entitled, General Electric Co. v. Joiner,15 the 
Supreme Court declared that Daubert gatekeeping decisions were not to be 
overturned by appellate courts unless the trial judge had clearly abused her 
discretion.  The abuse of discretion standard is one that can rarely be met by 
appellants.  Hence, the Supreme Court gave trial judges a relatively free hand 
in pre-screening various sorts of expert evidence.  Moreover, in March of 
1999, the Supreme Court extended Daubert’s reach beyond expert scientific 
testimony to all sorts of expert presentations.16  The net result of this activity 
has been that before a plaintiff can get to a jury in federal court with a case 
relying on expert evidence, he or she is likely to have to persuade the trial 
judge of the reliability, not just of the expert’s methodology, but of the expert’s 
specific testimony in the pending case.  This has meant that a vast body of 
 
 11. Id. at 592-95. 
 12. Id. at 589. 
 13. Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges Are Using 
Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 341 
(1999). 
 14. See Joseph Sanders, Scientifically Complex Cases, Trial by Jury, and the Erosion of 
Adversarial Processes, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 355, 369 (1998) (“courts . . . are less willing to admit 
marginal expert testimony than they were pre Daubert.”). 
 15. 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
 16. See Kuhmo Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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factual questions, some of them very close indeed, have been wrestled from the 
jury and given to the trial judge. 
The prophylactic effect may be dramatic and was clearly intended.  As 
Justice Breyer said in his concurrence in Joiner with respect to the sorts of 
chemical compounds there facing challenge: 
[M]odern life, including good health as well as economic well-being, depends 
upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances, such as chemicals.  And 
it may, therefore, prove particularly important to see judges fulfill their 
Daubert gatekeeping function, so that they help assure that the powerful 
engine of tort liability, which can generate strong financial incentives to 
reduce, or to eliminate, production, points towards the right substances and 
does not destroy the wrong ones.17 
Judges are, in essence, being empowered to make sure only the “right” 
defendants are sued.  This means that cases raising doubts, even close cases, 
are likely to be rejected – a substantial tightening of pre-trial evidentiary 
screening.  It also means that over the course of time, courts working on 
questions about the same product will create a body of evidence law that fixes 
which sorts of claims are deemed provable and which are not as well as the 
exact content of the proof required.18  If a plaintiff challenges the “wrong” 
product or offers anything less than the required proof, he will not get to the 
jury. 
B. Blindfolding Jurors to the Consequences of Their Decisions 
It is an oft repeated bon mot among lawyers that jurors should be treated 
like mushrooms – kept in the dark and fed an ample supply of horse manure.  
If the state of affairs described in this witticism has any reality, it is in part 
because, in certain circumstances, American evidence law purposely tries to 
blindfold jurors with respect to information about the consequences following 
from certain of the factual decisions they reach. 
Writing in the 1950s, the eminent scholar Leon Green, described what he 
perceived to be an alarming new trend in the law of the State of Texas, the 
interposition of “restrictions designed to prevent the jury from understanding 
and considering the full scope of the issues they must decide.”19  As may be 
surmised from the tenor of Professor Green’s description, he was opposed to 
blindfolding.  In discussing it, Green concentrated on the then expanding 
 
 17. 522 U.S. at 148-49. 
 18. This has already occurred in the toxic tort area where things like the number of 
epidemiological studies required, their level of statistical certainty and a host of other 
considerations have been specified in judicial evidentiary rulings.  See Sanders, supra note 14, at 
369-72. 
 19. Leon Green, Blindfolding the Jury, 33 TEX. L. REV. 157, 157 (1954). 
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doctrine that no mention ought to be made during trial of the fact that a 
defendant possessed liability insurance.  In the typical case, the existence of 
insurance coverage meant that the insurance company, not the named 
defendant, was the real party in interest.  Yet, the law insisted that the 
insurance provider not be identified.  In this way, it was hoped that jurors 
could be prevented from awarding excessive damages linked to the wealth 
(“deep pockets”) of the insurance company.20  In support of such a rule, it was 
argued that the identity of the true defendant was “not relevant to any issue in 
the case.”21 
Green took strong exception to these arguments.  He suggested that there 
was little proof that jurors unfairly taxed insurance companies and absolutely 
no ground to impugn “the integrity of juries.”22  Moreover, he cited a 
substantial number of situations in which insurance coverage would be 
relevant to the decision maker including its possible influence on the tenor of a 
party’s testimony as well as the impact of insurance company employee 
initiatives or advice on the conduct and perceptions of both parties and 
witnesses.  According to Green, the insurance blindfold also had the baleful 
effect of hiding from jurors the fact that a powerful and effective litigant was 
directing the defense case.  Despite this sharp criticism, the insurance blindfold 
remains firmly in place in many American jury trials and is incorporated 
(albeit in somewhat restricted form) in Rule 411 of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. 
As Professors Shari Diamond and Jonathan Casper have pointed out, 
blindfolding is a strategy designed to control juror behavior by keeping 
specific information from them at trial.23  It is, according to Diamond and 
Casper, a “crude” tool that relies on a simplistic model of jury behavior.24  It 
assumes that jurors are little more than passive recorders of the evidence 
presented who do not think about what they are being told, do not seek to 
integrate it with what they know from their life experiences and make no effort 
to consider the consequences or implications of the conclusions they reach 
during trial.  This crude picture ignores the persuasive body of social science 
research that suggests jurors are active information processors who work 
diligently to integrate the proof and their life experiences into a narrative that 
explains and resolves the case before them in light of the legal categories 
presented for decision.25  Whether it is a sound or foolish approach, American 
 
 20. Id. at 160. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 161. 
 23. Shari Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: 
Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513 (1992). 
 24. Id. at 515-16, 523. 
 25. Id. at 516-17. 
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legislatures and courts have demonstrated a keen interest in blindfolding in 
recent years. 
(1) Legislative Blindfolding to the Consequences of Allocations of Fault 
in Comparative Negligence Cases 
Throughout much of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
American courts recognized contributory negligence as an absolute defense in 
any negligence case.26  In other words, no matter now unreasonable the 
defendant’s behavior, the plaintiff could not recover a single penny if he or she 
had contributed in any degree to the injury suffered.  This harsh rule was 
slowly dismantled over the course of the last ninety years and replaced by a 
doctrine of comparative negligence pursuant to which the jury is asked to 
assess the percentage of fault attributable to each party’s conduct.  Under such 
a scheme, if the plaintiff is twenty percent at fault, he is allowed to recover 
eighty percent of his damages.  All possible allocations, ranging from a high of 
one hundred percent to the smallest fraction of one percent, lead to an award of 
damages. 
Some jurisdictions found this rule too liberal and sought to impose a 
regime of “modified” comparative negligence in which a plaintiff is barred 
from recovery if she or he is found fifty (or, in some states, fifty-one) percent 
responsible.  From the 1930s to the early 1970s, all the states that adopted 
modified comparative fault rules blindfolded jurors to the consequences of the 
rule in use.27  In other words, jurors were not to be told that the plaintiff would 
receive no award if found fifty (or fifty-one) percent responsible.  The apparent 
goal was to keep jurors from manipulating percentage findings to reflect their 
sympathy for a needy but legally undeserving plaintiff. 
A number of states found that jurors were confused by the implications of 
the modified comparative negligence rule.  Jurors often followed the natural 
tendency in close cases, where mathematical precision is impossible, to “split 
the difference” with a fifty/fifty award.  What they did not realize was that 
such a decision meant no recovery for the plaintiff.  In several jurisdictions, 
this led to a disproportionate number of defendant victories in close cases.  In 
response, some states decided to remove the blindfold and candidly inform 
jurors of the consequences of the allocation of percentages of fault.  As the 
1970s wore on, something of a consensus seemed to evolve that blindfolding 
was inappropriate and jurors should be informed of the ultimate consequences 
of their apportionment decisions.  State after state either enacted a “sunshine” 
 
 26. For a brief description of this doctrine and its history, see Stephan Landsman, The Civil 
Jury in America: Scenes from an Unappreciated History, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 579, 605-10 (1993). 
 27. The following discussion draws heavily on Martin A. Kotler, Reappraising the Jury’s 
Role as Finder of Fact, 20 GA. L. REV. 123 (1985). 
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provision or judicially embraced it.  In most cases, the motive seemed to be to 
insure well-formed decision-making by jurors who had all the factual and legal 
information before them and had not been tricked or inadvertently led to render 
decisions they thought were improper.  The trend progressed so far by the 
middle 1980s that it seemed as if this sort of civil blindfolding might become a 
thing of the past.28 
That trend was halted in 1995 when the State of Illinois became the first 
state in more than twenty years to mandate a comparative negligence blindfold.  
The blindfold law came about as part of an omnibus tort reform package that 
sought to radically reorient Illinois tort law in favor of defendants.  The law 
was the product of a hasty and lobbyist-inspired legislative session and was 
eventually invalidated by the Illinois Supreme Court.29  The Illinois blindfold 
legislation experience appears to present a revealing facet of the recent hyper-
prophylaxis approach to evidence.  Born out of a seeming distrust of jurors and 
a desire to help tort defendants, the Illinois legislation seemed to embrace the 
blindfolding strategy as a means of neutralizing active well-informed jury 
deliberations.  In so doing, it sought to manipulate and marginalize jurors – 
serving the ultimate agenda described by DamaÓka. 
(2) Judicial Blindfolding to the Consequences of a Not Guilty by Reason 
of Insanity Verdict 
The same approach seems to have been adopted by the Supreme Court of 
the United States in its 1994 decision in Shannon v. United States30 with 
respect to the question whether jurors should be blindfolded to the 
consequences of a finding that a criminal defendant is not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGI).  In 1958, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia decided Lyles v. United States.31  In that case, the trial judge had 
informed the jury that a recently passed statute (applicable only in the District 
of Columbia) required that if a defendant were found NGI, he or she would be 
confined to a hospital for the mentally ill.  Although there was much division 
in the appellate court, it was decided that such an instruction was proper and 
should be given unless the defendant requested otherwise.  Judge Prettyman, 
with the approval of a majority of his colleagues, declared, “We think the jury 
has a right to know the meaning of this possible verdict as accurately as it 
 
 28. Kotler wrote his article to decry this outcome and emphasize its implications in the 
criminal sentencing context.  Id. 
 29. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). 
 30. 512 U.S. 573 (1994). 
 31. 254 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1957). 
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knows by common knowledge the meaning of the other two possible verdicts 
[guilty and not guilty].”32 
In 1984, Congress enacted the Insanity Defense Reform Act33 which 
mandated that something like the District of Columbia insanity confinement 
procedure be made available when relevant in federal criminal proceedings 
throughout the United States.  In 1990, Terry Lee Shannon, a felon with 
significant mental problems,34 was stopped by a police officer in Tupelo, 
Mississippi.  Rather than accompany the officer to a police station as 
requested, Shannon crossed a street, pulled a gun from his coat and shot 
himself in the chest.  Shannon survived this apparent suicide attempt and was 
prosecuted under a federal statute that makes it a crime for a felon to be in 
unlawful possession of a firearm.  Shannon’s counsel requested that the jury be 
instructed about the consequences of an NGI verdict.  This request was denied 
by the District Court, a decision affirmed by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
Noting the conflict with the decision in the Lyles cases, the Supreme Court 
agreed to review Shannon’s conviction.  Writing for a seven member majority, 
Justice Thomas upheld jury blindfolding and rejected the precedent established 
in Lyles.  Thomas began by noting that it was “well established” that when 
jurors have no sentencing function they should not be allowed or encouraged 
“to consider the consequences of their verdicts.”35  This prophylactic rule 
reflected the “basic division of labor” between judge and jury in which “[t]he 
jury’s function is to find the facts and to decide whether, on those facts, the 
defendant is guilty . . . [while] [t]he judge, by contrast, imposes sentence on the 
defendant after the jury has arrived at a guilty verdict.”36  On this reading of 
the functions of the judge and jury, the latter has no business worrying about 
sentence at all, it is “irrelevant to the jury’s task.”37  Divulging sentence 
consequences to jurors is inappropriate and serves no purpose other than to 
invite “them to ponder matters that are not within their province.”38 
Shannon’s counsel pressed the argument, accepted in Lyles, that it is 
important to insure that jurors have an accurate understanding of the 
consequences of an NGI verdict so that they can properly discharge their 
decision-making function.  Justice Thomas rejected this contention.  Juror 
 
 32. Id. at 728. 
 33. 18 U.S.C. §§ 17, 4241-47 (1988). 
 34. For a description of the experts’ assessment of Shannon’s mental problems, see Randi 
Ellias, Supreme Court Review: Should Courts Instruct Juries as to the Consequences to a 
Defendant of a “Not Guilty by Reason of Insanity” Verdict?, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1062, 1071-72 n.96 (1995). 
 35. 512 U.S. at 579. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
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understanding of the NGI verdict was not important according to Thomas.  The 
jury had been instructed “to apply the law . . . regardless of the consequence”39 
and the Supreme Court was willing to assume (whether the assumption was 
accurate or not) that the jurors would follow that instruction.  The court hence 
embraced the theory of a passive jury that could and indeed should, be treated 
like so many mushrooms.  The court seemed to go even further and endorse 
not only NGI blindfolding, but a firm rule against informing jurors of any 
sentence.  As Justice Thomas put it: 
Shannon offers us no principled way to limit the availability of instructions 
detailing the consequences of a verdict to cases in which an NGI defense is 
raised.  Jurors may be as unfamiliar with other aspects of the criminal 
sentencing process as they are with NGI verdicts.  But, as a general matter, 
jurors are not informed of mandatory minimum or maximum sentences, nor are 
they instructed regarding probation, parole, or the sentencing range 
accompanying a lesser included offense.40 
The net result of Shannon was wholesale adoption of the idea that jurors 
should almost never be informed about the consequences of findings of guilt or 
NGI in the criminal cases before them.  Jurors are conceptualized as a passive 
instrument of fact finding.  Their confusion or misimpressions about legal 
consequences are of no significance.  The sentence, like the existence of 
insurance, is to be treated as “irrelevant” evidence.  As Professor Green points 
out, such an assumption is, as a practical matter, misguided.  Police officers, 
prosecutors, witnesses and defendants are all dramatically influenced by 
possible sentence.  Moreover, as Diamond and Casper have pointed out, the 
underlying assumption of jury passivity is subject to the strongest challenge on 
psychological grounds.  The Supreme Court swept all that aside in its efforts to 
insure control of the jury by means of a prophylactic blindfold.  The result, 
again, was the manipulation and marginalization of the jury.  The 
marginalization, as suggested by Shannon has been extended to the question of 
sentence in virtually all criminal cases.  Despite a long history of Anglo-
American criminal jury trials in which jurors were clearly aware of sentencing 
consequences and constructed their decisions so as to manipulate those 
consequences,41 the Supreme Court thought an absolute blindfold appropriate.  
This notwithstanding the existence of mandatory sentencing mechanisms that 
remove all discretion from the judge and thereby deny her any real role in 
sentencing. 
 
 39. Id. at 585. 
 40. Id. at 586-87 (citations omitted). 
 41. See Colleen Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal 
Juries, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 723, 782-84 (1993) (“To be sure, the eighteenth-century English 
jury often found facts against the weight of the evidence to mitigate harsh sanctions.”). 
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III.  A COUNTER TREND:  ENCOURAGEMENT OF AN ACTIVE AND ENGAGED 
JURY 
Were the prophylactic trend the only thing affecting evidence law, 
America would be well on its way to strangling the jury trial and realizing 
DamaÓka’s vision of a juryless process governed by evidence rules that take no 
account of the peculiarities of lay decision making.  But expansion of the arid 
evidentiary exercises that hem in an increasingly passive group of laymen is 
not the only development in American evidence law.  In fact, the American 
jury may be undergoing something of a renaissance.  In at least ten states, there 
have been serious studies of the way jury trials are managed and might be 
improved.42  Among those ten, Arizona, Colorado, the District of Columbia, 
New York, California and Texas (the last three being the most populous states 
in America) have converted their studies into specific reforms or, at a 
minimum, integrated reform proposals. 
The leader in this effort and the model for reform has been Arizona.  In 
1993, its Supreme Court called for a comprehensive review of jury service and 
practice.  The result was a report entitled, Jurors: The Power of 12.43  It 
generated a list of fifty-five recommendations for the improvement of jury 
trials (attached as Appendix I).  These were embraced by the Arizona Supreme 
Court and many were immediately adopted.  The fifty-five proposals have 
served as a template for reform in other states, and helped inspire the American 
Bar Association Litigation Section, the National Center for State Courts and 
the State Justice Institute (three of the most prominent of America’s legal 
organizations) to produce a manual entitled Jury Trial Innovations.44  This 
manual, among other things, explores the changes proposed or adopted in 
Arizona with an eye to encouraging judges working elsewhere to use them 
when possible.  The manual has been distributed to all federal judges and is in 
the process of being disseminated in state courts. 
The basic thrust of all this material is the empowerment of the jury, 
recognition of its active (rather than passive) nature, and alteration of those 
rules and practices that stand in the way of effective jury trials.  A cursory 
examination of three of the fifty-five Arizona proposals should make this point 
clear.  Number thirty-one on the Arizona list recommends that courts “Ensure 
Note-taking by Jurors in Civil Cases.”  This proposal grew out of a series of 
social science studies that championed a more active role for jurors in the trial 
 
 42. See AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY, ENHANCING THE JURY SYSTEM – A GUIDEBOOK 
FOR JURY REFORM COMMISSIONERS (1999). 
 43. ARIZONA SUPREME COURT COMMITTEE ON MORE EFFECTIVE USE OF JURIES, JURORS: 
THE POWER OF 12 (1993). 
 44. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, JURY TRIAL INNOVATIONS (G. Thomas 
Munsterman et al. eds., 1997). 
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of lawsuits.45  Jurors who take written notes are likely to become more actively 
involved in processing the evidence they hear.46  Research demonstrates that 
note-taking also aids memory and heightens participation in deliberations.47  
Thus do jurors become more deeply engaged in each step of the fact gathering 
and decision making process. 
This first step toward greater activity is succeeded on the Arizona list by 
Number thirty-four, which instructs courts to “Allow Jurors to Ask Questions.”  
Here, the passive jury model is set aside in favor of direct juror inquiry.  Jurors 
are treated as trial participants whose questions must be addressed.  Jury 
questioning will, inevitably, stretch the rules of evidence as lay decision 
makers, untutored in the niceties of prophylactic rules push for the information 
that will help them understand the case.  While it is not likely that the 
established rules will fall before an onslaught of juror questions, principles like 
those embodied in the relevancy rule will be stretched.  This loosening was 
identified as the natural and anticipated direction of developments by the 
Arizona committee with its proposal Number forty-one which directs judges: 
“Do Not Instruct Juries on Jury Nullification; However, the Rules of Evidence 
Ought to be Expanded in Recognition of the Jury’s Power to Nullify.” 
Far more significant than the specific evidentiary impact of these Arizona 
reforms is the change they signal in the conceptualization of the jury.  The 
prophylactic rules are premised on an ignorant and vulnerable jury in need of 
protection from proof.  Such a body is nothing more than a passive recording 
device that can be switched on and off or told what to think.  Such a jury can 
never be more than a marginal player, a weak-minded decision maker from 
whom difficult evidence and ultimate consequences should be hidden.  Such a 
jury cannot be trusted with any information that might provoke it to transgress 
the judicially-defined limits of the division of labor.  The Arizona proposals 
see a very different sort of jury.  One that is active, thoughtful and capable of 
understanding the case before it.  It is an insightful body that should be 
encouraged to follow all the evidence, ask questions to augment the evidence 
and, more generally, participate.  In the presence of such a jury, evidence rules 
must be flexible, allowing the admission of more information than would 
traditionally have been permitted. 
The Arizona program does not require the abandonment of the rules of 
evidence but does challenge the prophylactic or marginalizing foundation on 
which they are built.  This challenge arises at the same time as scholarly 
empirical examination is starting to raise serious questions about a number of 
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 46. Id. at 258. 
 47. Id. 
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classic prophylactic rules.  Perhaps chief among these is the hearsay rule.  
Preliminary research suggests that jurors handle at least some sorts of hearsay 
with thoughtfulness and care.48  If these preliminary findings are borne out by 
further research, there may be good reason to dismantle the elaborate hearsay 
edifice while still relying on juries to adjudicate cases.  Although the course of 
future developments if far from clear, there is some indication that the rules of 
evidence will be relaxed, not because jurors have been banished, but because 
of the realization that many such rules do not serve the central objectives of a 
system constitutionally committed to adjudication by lay jurors. 
IV.  HOW SHOULD WE REACT TO THESE COMPETING TRENDS IN EVIDENCE 
LAW? 
Courts follow a more than century old tradition when they invoke 
prophylactic strategies.  In doing so, they claim to be insuring the probity of 
the adjudicatory process.  Despite the sanction of history (albeit “recent”) and 
the rhetoric of probity, the prophylactic approach, most particularly the 
employment of blindfolds, deserves to be rejected in most settings.  At the 
outset, it should be noted that blindfolding often poses a series of practical 
problems.  Blindfolding may lead jurors to make decisions that do not reflect 
their real assessment of the case before them.  Such was apparently the 
situation in the majority of jurisdictions that had adopted both a modified 
comparative negligence scheme (fifty percent liability bars recovery) and a 
blindfold regarding the scheme’s operation.  Most states in these circumstances 
shifted from a blindfold to a “sunshine” rule to insure that jurors understood 
the consequences or their choice of liability percentage.  The obvious concern 
was split-the-difference decisions that inadvertently deprived plaintiffs of all 
recovery.  Blindfolds often pose similar risks by denying jurors crucial 
information about the real import of the choices they are asked to make, 
leaving them to stumble around in the dark and frequently producing 
unintended and unjust results. 
 
 48. See Margaret Bull Kovera, Roger C. Park & Steven D. Penrod, Jurors’ Perception of 
Eyewitness and Hearsay Evidence, 76 MINN. L. REV. 703 (1992); Stephan Landsman & Richard 
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C. Park & Engene Borgida, Juror Decision Making and the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 
MINN. L. REV. 683 (1992); Angela Paglia & Regina A. Schuller, Jurors’ Use of Hearsay 
Evidence.  The Effect of Type and Timing of Instructions, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1998); 
Richard F. Rakos & Stephan Landsman, Researching the Hearsay Rule: Emerging Findings, 
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Blindfolds are an imperfect tool at best.  Quite frequently, some number of 
jurors will have personal information regarding an embargoed subject, whether 
it is a rule concerning monetary recovery or one constraining criminal 
sentencing options.  Unfortunately, there is no guarantee that this information 
is accurate.  Despite its unreliability, however, it is likely to be pressed into 
service because of its salience to the task at hand and the legitimate desire of 
jurors to get as much information as possible about the nature of what they 
have been asked to do.  If the personal information is accurate, the blindfold is 
likely to be defeated as jurors use what they know.  If the information is 
erroneous, it is likely to skew trial results.  As Diamond and Casper have put it: 
Blindfolding is unlikely to achieve its purposes when juries hold strong 
expectations about the information they are given . . . .  [I]f most jurors believe 
that defendants in automobile cases have substantial liability coverage, not 
telling them that the insured defendant has such coverage does not eliminate a 
possible deep-pocket effect.  By the same token, if the defendant actually has 
little or no insurance, a blindfolded jury operating under a presumption that the 
defendant is insured may award more than true compensation because it 
incorrectly assumes a deep pocket will pay.49 
By refusing to reveal the true state of affairs, courts relying on blindfolds 
frequently open the door to distortion and mistake. 
The primary fear regarding disclosure of blindfold material has been that 
revelation will provoke jurors to misbehave, to refashion their decisions in 
ways that defeat the objectives of the underlying law.  This may, indeed, 
sometimes occur.  To assess the risk Diamond and Casper tested mock juror 
reactions to disclosure of the law in a private antitrust case.  In such cases, the 
relevant statute mandates that the jury’s award be trebled.  Courts have held 
that jurors should be blindfolded to this fact because of fears that hearing about 
the trebling will lead them improperly to reduce their awards, thereby 
undermining the punitive objective of the law.50  What the experimenters 
found was that mock jurors did reduce their awards if simply informed about 
the trebling requirement.51  This effect, however, was negated if, in addition to 
the fact of trebling, the jurors were given a reasonably complete and candid 
explanation of the law’s purpose.52  At least in this experiment, candor worked 
as well as a blindfold while, at the same time, neutralizing the risk that jurors 
might choose to utilize erroneous personal information. 
Not all cases can be resolved this simply.  There are pieces of information 
that irretrievably distort juror decision making.  Perhaps the most significant of 
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 52. Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2002] OF MUSHROOMS AND NULLIFIERS 79 
 
these is information that an individual on trial in a criminal case has a prior 
criminal record.  When such information is disclosed, it substantially 
diminishes the defendant’s chance for acquittal and no form of instruction or 
explanation seems to help.53  In fact, trained judges, when exposed to such 
information, seem to experience a virtually identical reaction.54  In this 
situation, where strong and ineradicable prejudice seems unavoidable, 
blindfolding makes sense.  Because American jury trials feature a bifurcated 
method of adjudication (jury and judge each handling part of the task), the jury 
can be reasonably effectively screened from information about criminal 
history, thus helping secure fairer deliberations.55  In rare cases such as this, 
where there is an overwhelming consensus concerning the risk of prejudice and 
honest discussion seems unavailing, blindfolding may be warranted.  
Ironically, in this most poignant of contexts, American evidence rules have 
created a host of exceptions to the requirement that jurors be shielded from 
prior criminal history.56 
Providing juries with full information should be recognized as more than 
simply a practical way to insure sound results.  The shocks caused by the jury 
decision in the O.J. Simpson murder trial and the Rodney King beating case 
notwithstanding,57 the jury is perhaps the only public institution capable of 
responding in a non-partisan fashion to America’s most inflammatory 
problems.  The American jury has been justly described as the “conscience of 
the community.”58  It is the place where ordinary citizens are called together to 
insure the just operation of government.  It is unaffiliated with party or cause 
and speaks for the entire community.  A part of the jury’s task is to recognize 
and give substance to the community’s values.59  As the eminent federal judge 
and evidence scholar Jack Weinstein has said, “[j]urors help keep us sensitive 
 
 53. See, e.g., Roselle L. Wissler & Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting 
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to wrong, immoral and unjust laws.”60  In this way, the jury gives voice to our 
shared concerns, a vital service in fractious times. 
For the jury truly to fulfill these roles, it must be treated with respect.  
Respect seems ever harder to secure the more jurors are consigned to the fate 
of mushrooms.  For the jury to do its best, it must be afforded an opportunity to 
fully weigh the questions raised by the cases before it.  Generally, when the 
gravest choices are to be made, American law demands that the decision maker 
be fully informed.  This is certainly the case when patients are asked to make 
the most profound decisions about their lives and care.  Nothing less than 
informed consent will be accepted.61  The same reasoning ought to apply when 
we ask juries to answer the most serious legal questions.  It is, after all, hard to 
give full credit to any law that must be hidden from public view in order to be 
enforced. 
It is most frequently objected that candid disclosures encompassing such 
things as potential criminal sentence or civil consequences will lead juries to 
“nullify” the law, in other words, disregard its dictates and arrive at unjustified 
outcomes based on sympathy or prejudice.  The nullification argument raises a 
number of questions.  First, it is unclear whether the term should be applied to 
most cases where juries appear to thwart generally shared views of the law or 
the legal implications of the facts.  Such cases are seldom so clear as to 
foreclose all questions.  Often juries are doing no more than interpreting the 
law when they disappoint common expectations.  Second, even when juries 
reject the clear and applicable mandate of a law, they may be fully justified.  
Jurors in such cases may be legitimately reacting to official misconduct, an 
unjust statute or a law’s unfair application in a peculiar context.62  All these 
seem valid juror concerns in both moral and historical terms in a system where 
jurors are authorized to deliver an unexplained general verdict and enjoy an 
unreviewable power to acquit.  The Supreme Court has explicitly recognized 
that the criminal jury has a constitutional function beyond mere fact-finding: to 
serve as buffer against abuses of governmental power.63 
Juries have, on occasion, refused to apply laws and hence deprived 
minority citizens of their rights.  This was most glaringly the case in the 
American South from the end of post-Civil War Reconstruction to the height 
of the civil rights movement.  This sort of lawlessness is deeply troubling.  
Judge Weinstein has argued that group process will generally serve to cancel 
out individual prejudice and that procedural safeguards can dampen most risks 
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of unjust results.64  These protections can be substantially enhanced if 
decisions requiring that jury service be open to all citizens are rigorously 
enforced.65  Still, the unreviewable power of the jury does pose some risks.  
These, however, must be deemed to have been accepted when the framers 
fashioned the American Constitution and its original ten amendments. 
 
 64. Weinstein, supra note 60, at 245. 
 65. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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APPENDIX I 
Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of Juries 
 
SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
[From B. Michael Dann & George Logan III, Jury Reform: The Arizona 
Experience, 79 JUDICATURE 280, 282 (1996).  Items in italics enacted pursuant 
to Arizona Supreme Court Rule Changes Effective December 1, 1995.  
Footnotes deleted.] 
A. Public Awareness 
1. Undertake Programs of Public Education About Juries and Jury Trials. 
B. Summoning Jurors 
2. Improve Current Juror Source Lists. 
3. Use Additional Juror Source Lists. 
4. Improve Jury Diversity [T]hrough “Random Stratified Selection.” 
5. Study Summoning Jurors on Regional Basis. 
6. Striking of Grossly Unrepresentative Jury Panels. 
7. Obtain More Demographic Information from Jurors. 
8. Supply More Information to Persons Summoned. 
9. Limit Potential Juror Report Dates. 
10. Deal with Failures to Respond to Jury Summons. 
11. Handling and Monitoring Requests for Deferral and for Excusal of 
Service. 
12. Update and Expand Initial Courthouse Orientation. 
13. Improve Rate of Utilization of Potential Jurors. 
14. Show Appreciation to Potential Jurors Not Needed for Juries. 
15. The Needs of Jurors [W]ho [A]re Disable Should [B]e Met. 
16. Reform and Improve Juror Pay and Mileage. 
17. Juror-Supplied Locating Information Should Remain Confidential 
During Jury Selection and Thereafter. 
C. Jury Selection 
18. Encourage Mini-Opening Statements Before Voir Dire. 
19. Allow Judges to Choose Between the “Struck” and the “Strike and 
Replace” Methods of Jury Selection. 
20. Assure Lawyers the right to Voir Dire in All Cases. 
21. Judges Should Receive Training in Voir Dire. 
22. Protect Juror Privacy During Voir Dire. 
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23. Continue Peremptory Strikes in Present Form and Number. 
24. Vigorously Enforce Batson Safeguards. 
D. Trial 
25. Set and Enforce Time Limits for Trials. 
26. Guidelines for Severance in Complex Cases [A]re Needed. 
27. Jury Trial Time Should [B]e Maximized. 
28. Trial Interruptions Should [B]e Minimized. 
29. Juror Notebooks Should [B]e Provided in Some Cases. 
30. Expand Use of Preliminary Jury Instructions. 
31. Ensure Notetaking by Jurors in Civil Cases. 
32. Improve Management of Trial Exhibits. 
33. Deposition Summaries Should [B]e Used. 
34. Allow Jurors to Ask Questions. 
35. Educate Attorneys and Judges Concerning Interim Summaries During 
Trial. 
36. Use Modern Information Technology More Often in Trials. 
37. Allow Jurors to Discuss the Evidence Among Themselves During the 
Trial. 
38. Use Only Plain English in Trials, Especially in Legal Instructions 
39. Do [N]ot Keep Jurors Waiting While Instructions [A]re Settled. 
40. Make Jury Instructions Understandable and Case-Specific and Give 
Guidance Regarding Deliberations. 
41. Do [N]ot Instruct Juries on Jury Nullification; However, the Rules of 
Evidence Ought to [B]e Expanded in Recognition of the Jury’s 
[P]ower to Nullify. 
42. Give Jurors Copies of the Jury Instructions. 
43. Read the Final Instructions Before Closing Arguments of Counsel, Not 
After. 
44. Alternate Jurors Should Not Be Released From Service in Criminal 
Case Until a Verdict [I]s Announced or the Jury [I]s Discharged. 
45 Allow All Jurors Remaining at the End of a Civil Trial to Deliberate 
and Vote. 
E. Jury Deliberations 
46. The Trial Judge Should Decide on a Schedule for Jury Deliberations 
and Inform Jurors in Advance. 
47. Encourage Juror Questions About the Final Instructions. 
48. Fully Answer Deliberating Jurors’ Questions and Meet Their 
Requests. 
49. Offer the Assistance of the Judge and Counsel to Deliberating Jurors 
[W]ho Report an Impasse. 
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50. When Jurors Reported to [B]e at Impasse [A]re Returned for Further 
Deliberation They Should Not Be Instructed Any Further. 
F. Post-Verdict Stage 
51. Become proactive in Detecting and Treating Juror Stress. 
52. Assist Jurors in Coping with Fears of Contact or Retaliation. 
53. Solicit Jurors’ Reactions to their Courthouse Experience. 
54. Advise Jurors Concerning Post-Verdict Conversations with the Judge, 
Attorneys and the Media. 
G. Jurors’ Bill of Rights 
55. Promulgate A Proposed Bill of Rights for Arizona Jurors. 
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